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Abstract. If the access network is an economic bottleneck, then the regulator may 
consider vertical separation of the telecommunications incumbent. There is the 
concern that separation dilutes quality-enhancing network investment, and social 
welfare. We show that, despite some loss of operational coordination and 
potential hold-up problems, vertical separation may raise investment and welfare 
compared with integration. While structural more than functional separation raises 
investment, it is functional more than structural separation that raises welfare (due 
to investment cost). The results obtained shed light on the effects of different 
forms of separation on the incentive to build-out Next Generation Access 
networks (NGAs). 
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 This paper has been presented at the 24th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in 
Barcelona, 23-27 August 2009. An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Telecom ParisTech 
Conference on the Economics of ICT in Paris, 19–20 June 2008. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates how the vertical industry structure affects the bottleneck owner’s 
incentives to invest in infrastructure quality, and more generally social welfare. For this 
purpose, we compare the relevant outcomes under three alternative scenarios of vertical 
integration, structural separation, and functional separation of the bottleneck owner. 
 We focus on fixed telecommunications2. The bottleneck in this industry is the wireline 
local access network, since replication of the incumbent’s assets is generally infeasible or 
economically undesirable3. The access network owner typically is under the scrutiny of a 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) that imposes behavioral remedies relative to wholesale 
access conditions, while preserving vertical integration in retail markets4. Vertical separation 
implies splitting the incumbent into an upstream entity managing bottleneck activities and 
providing wholesale access, and a downstream entity managing competitive activities (such as 
the long-distance backbone) and providing retail services. 
 We distinguish two options for vertical separation. Structural separation entails distinct 
ownership and control of upstream and downstream entities. Functional separation implies 
creating independent business units, but does not imply a change of ownership of assets (see 
e.g. Cave, 2006). Thus, the sole owners of the firm take strategic long-run decisions (such as 
network investment) in the interest of the whole company, although they cannot completely 
control short-run decisions (such as retail pricing). 
                                                 
2
 However, the situation where a dominant firm controls the supply of an essential input, while there is potential 
infrastructure competition in vertically related markets, is common to network industries such as electricity, 
gas, and railways (where the bottleneck respectively is electricity transmission, gas transportation, and railway 
track). See OECD (2006) for a review on the pro-competitive effects of vertical separation in several countries. 
3
 Empirical evidence shows that competitive access network roll out in Europe has been targeted at business 
customers or urban areas, so as there is limited replication of the incumbent’s access network (COCOM, 2008). 
On the other hand, end-to-end infrastructure competition is more developed in other countries, such as the US. 
4
 However, accounting separation has frequently been used to improve the effectiveness of behavioral remedies. 
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 In this paper, we formally address three basic issues: i) is vertical separation of the 
bottleneck owner a proper remedy to promote competition under prospective deployment of 
new access infrastructures (the so-called Next Generation Access networks, or NGAs)?; ii) 
does vertical separation foster, or rather hamper investment in NGAs?; and iii) which type of 
separation (if any), functional or structural, produces social gains, and in which cases? 
 In the recent past, the benefits of separation have been deemed uncertain while the costs 
potentially large (see e.g. OECD, 2003). One of the rationales is that vertical separation would 
threaten the loss or reduction of operational coordination between upstream and downstream 
activities5. Thus, the impact on consumers in terms of reduced prices and improved service 
quality would be unclear, while there would be a considerable one-off cost of divestment. 
 However, when the access network is an enduring economic bottleneck, the vertically 
integrated firm has both the motivation and the means to foreclose competitors. Actually, the 
classic response of behavioral regulation to price and, above all, non-price discrimination is 
often ineffectual. Thus, the NRA should be able to treat structural competition problems by 
structural remedies. Under vertical separation, the NRA can effectively impose on the 
upstream entity the obligation to treat all downstream entities, either affiliated or unaffiliated, 
in a perfectly equivalent manner, thus ensuring equality of access to the bottleneck input6. 
 One of the most critical issues related to mandatory separation of the integrated firm is the 
adverse effect this may produce on investment in network quality. Because of the 
incompleteness of contracts, if investment involves relationship-specific assets then vertical 
                                                 
5
 Vertical integration may enhance the availability of information; may exploit economies of scope; may reduce 
transaction costs; and may reduce the distortions associated with upstream and/or downstream market power. 
6
 Structural separation has been rarely adopted in telecommunications (a notable exception being the break up of 
the Bell System in the US in 1984). Nonetheless, the European Commission has recently proposed to include 
functional separation in the set of remedies that NRAs may use to promote competition in relevant markets. 
Functional separation has already been employed in the UK, where the incumbent has committed to behavioral 
and organizational changes to provide essential wholesale services on an ‘equivalence of inputs’ basis. 
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separation potentially gives rise to hold up problems causing suboptimal investment. This 
adverse effect would be highly detrimental in the current phase where several incumbents 
worldwide have announced the build out of NGAs7. In fact, NGAs deliver very high 
bandwidths that support provision of new value-added interactive services (such as High-
Definition IP-TV)8, and may increase the productivity and competitiveness of a country. 
 It is worth noting that the unique characteristics of NGAs are likely to have a profound 
effect on competition and industry structure, thus posing new regulatory challenges. On the 
one hand, incumbents argue that a lenient regulatory regime is vital to maintain the economic 
rationale to roll out NGAs, which may impose significant costs and risks. On the other hand, 
prospective technology deployments raise Other Licensed Operators’ (OLOs’) costs and 
undermine the progress recently achieved in intra-platform competition through Local Loop 
Unbundling, or LLU (see e.g. Leporelli and Reverberi, 2003 and 2004)9. If there is scarce 
inter-platform competition, then vertical separation (with suitably regulated charges to NGAs) 
may be essential to prevent market foreclosure. 
 Our model considers the main effects of the vertical industry structure on efficiency and 
competition, and their impact on access regulation and investment. We assume that, in all 
scenarios, the NRA sets the network access charge10, while firms compete in prices in the 
retail broadband access market, where there is partial participation, that is, low-willingness to 
pay (henceforth, wtp) consumers may not be active. Under vertical integration, the incumbent 
                                                 
7
 NGAs are realized by extending the fibre network closer to the customer premises, either to the home (FTTH 
architecture) or to the street cabinet (FTTC architecture). NGA investment plans include mainly FTTC 
deployments in Europe, and mainly FTTH deployments in the US, Korea and Japan. 
8
 Capacity constraints may mean that wireless networks are less suitable for such high-bandwidth applications. 
9
 A number of studies estimate that sub-loop unbundling (SLU), which requires OLOs to further extend their 
networks compared with LLU, is not economically viable to reach the mass market (see e.g. Analysis, 2007). 
10
 Thus, we assume that the NRA has no direct control over network investment. This is generally the case when 
the investing firm does not receive public subsidies. 
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has a two-fold advantage over the rival firm, which results in vertical product differentiation. 
First, she has a higher operational co-ordination. Second, she has a higher ability to benefit 
from investment in network quality and provide value-added services11. 
 Under vertical separation, downstream firms attain truly equivalent access to the essential 
input. Thus, we assume that they gain the same demand-side spillover from investment12. 
With functional separation, the incumbent maintains some efficiencies of integration (such as 
operational coordination), so as to provide higher quality than the rival firm. Moreover, the 
upstream entity invests to maximize the whole company’s profit, thus reducing hold up 
problems. Structural separation causes the highest efficiency loss relative to integration, but 
removes any downstream competitive advantage. Moreover, the access owner gains the entire 
profit in the upstream market and takes investment decisions on the sole basis of that profit. 
 We obtain that vertical separation may raise quality investment compared with vertical 
integration. This finding is all the more evident the more effectively separation promotes 
competition. Thus, in contrast to the prevailing wisdom, there is not a clear trade-off between 
fostering competition and ensuring investment. When there is a monopoly under integration13, 
separation raises investment provided that there is a small loss of operational coordination, or 
the investment spillover is high. When there is a duopoly under integration, a necessary 
condition for separation to raise investment is that separation does not reduce market 
participation. This condition is also sufficient when the investment spillover is high enough. 
 We have a higher access charge and higher investment under structural rather than 
functional separation, while things are more controversial when separation is compared with 
                                                 
11
 Thus, the integrated firm enjoys a higher demand-side spillover from investment. This follows from premium 
content provision, or from non-price discrimination degrading the input quality provided to the rival firm. 
12
 We also assume that, due to coordination problems, the spillover is lower than the one of the integrated firm. 
13
 Despite access regulation, the integrated firm may strategically invest to foreclose the rival firm. 
 6 
integration. In fact, we have that vertical separation is not always associated with a higher 
access charge, and that a higher charge does not always imply higher investment. The results 
obtained depend on the interplay between retail competitive conditions associated with 
vertical industry structures and access regulation. 
 We also obtain that vertical separation may raise welfare compared with integration. 
When there is a monopoly under integration, a necessary condition for either functional or 
structural separation to raise welfare is that it raises investment. When there is a duopoly 
under integration, it is only functional separation that raises welfare when the investment 
spillover is high enough. Albeit structural separation always encourages higher investment 
compared with functional separation, in the great majority of cases the gross social surplus 
generated by the additional investment does not offset the incremental investment cost. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 presents 
the model and compares the alternative scenarios respectively of vertical integration and 
separation (either functional or structural). Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 Relevant literature 
There is a small literature that investigates how the institutional setting affects investment in 
network quality. In a recent policy paper, Cave and Doyle (2007) argue that there is not 
evidence that vertical separation dilutes investment incentives compared with an integrated 
structure. Nonetheless, the results obtained in some formal papers do not support this claim. 
 Buehler et al. (2004) show that, in a chain of monopolies (possibly with competition for 
the retail market), the network owner’s quality investment is generally smaller under vertical 
separation than integration. Buehler et al. (2006) allow for retail quantity competition with a 
homogeneous product. They show that there is a price vs. quality trade-off when opening up 
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an integrated monopoly to competition and banning the incumbent from the retail market, 
since it cannot yield both a lower retail price and higher network quality. However, they do 
not weigh vertical integration (with downstream competition) directly against separation in 
terms of investment and welfare. They also do not consider the most relevant case to the retail 
broadband market, that is, imperfect price competition with differentiated products14. 
 The same remarks hold for Cremer et al. (2007), which have been the first to model the 
scenario of functional separation (‘legal unbundling’) as is done in our paper15. They find that 
disallowing joint ownership of upstream and downstream facilities (as in the case of structural 
separation) reduces investment in network size. While their finding is a direct implication of 
the hold up problem, their model fails to consider the countervailing impact that structural 
separation has on downstream competition, and that this in turn may have on investment. 
 A major difference from our model is that we consider investment in network quality. 
Different from investment in network size, quality investment raises consumers’ wtp so as to 
shift firms’ demand curves upwards. In addition, the marginal cost of investment rises with 
quality while is constant with size. Hence, different from investment in size, in our model a 
higher investment is not necessarily associated with higher social surplus. Moreover, the 
access charge is not optimally regulated at cost, but depends on the vertical industry structure. 
 Chen and Sappington (2009) try to fill a void in the literature by recognizing that the 
optimal design of input pricing rules, accounting explicitly for investment incentives, should 
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 On more technical grounds, they do not assume specific demand and cost functions, but they consider only 
interior solutions. Conversely, we make standard assumptions, but we show that corner solutions play a major 
role. Moreover, they assume an exogenous access charge, while in our model the NRA sets the optimal charge. 
15
 Hoeffler and Kranz (2007) assume that under legal unbundling it is the downstream affiliated unit that aims at 
maximizing the whole firm’s profit. This assumption is less suited to deal with upstream network investment. 
 8 
depend on the prevailing industry structure and on the nature of downstream competition16. 
They find that the optimal rule tends to depart more from cost under vertical integration with 
Cournot competition (thus fostering higher investment), and under vertical separation with 
Bertrand competition (but the impact on investment is less clear). Nonetheless, they consider 
process innovation rather than product innovation. Moreover, they do not consider the case of 
functional separation. Finally, they assume competition with a homogeneous product17. 
 On the whole, the above papers are well suited to such network industries as energy and 
railways, but less suited to model broadband competition in telecoms. As we have argued, the 
latter requires different assumptions, which we try to consider in our model. We are thus able 
to reverse previous literature findings. In fact, we find that quality investment may be higher 
under separation than integration, and that (mostly functional) separation may raise welfare. 
 
 
3 The model 
An upstream firm provides wholesale access to a bottleneck (the local network) to two 
downstream firms i and e competing in the retail broadband access market. Downstream firms 
cannot bypass the local network, so as they have to buy the essential input from the upstream 
firm in order to provide retail services. Consequently, if downstream firms are pure service 
                                                 
16
 There has been wide research on static access pricing to a vertically integrated firm’s network (see Armstrong, 
2002), but there is a limited literature on the dynamic properties of access pricing rules (see Guthrie, 2006). 
17
 In their model, the regulator maximizes consumer surplus rather than welfare. They find that the output with 
Cournot competition is insensitive to non-price discrimination by the vertically integrated firm. They also find 
that the same retail price prevails under both vertical integration and separation with Bertrand competition. It 
would be of interest to study how these findings are sensitive to modelling assumptions. 
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providers then they pay a wholesale access charge w. We assume that this charge is regulated, 
while the retail market is not18.  
 The upstream firm undertakes infrastructure investment to upgrade the quality of the 
access network. We assume that this firm incurs a quadratic cost 2)( 2xxC = , where x is the 
level of quality investment, which is for every potential user. We also assume that the firm 
has a constant marginal (per-user) cost of providing the essential input, which, without loss of 
generality, we normalize to zero. Downstream firms benefit from an increase in consumers’ 
wtp for the value-added services they are enabled to provide on the basis of network 
investment19. For simplicity, we normalize any downstream cost to zero. 
 We consider three alternative scenarios, where the upstream firm respectively is vertically 
integrated with downstream firm i, functionally separated, or structurally separated. In the 
following sections, first we analyze separately these scenarios, and then compare the results 
obtained to evaluate how the vertical industry structure affects incentives to invest in network 
quality and, more generally, social welfare. We relegate formal proofs to the Appendix. 
 We define a three-stage game of complete information. The timing is as follows: (i) the 
regulator sets the wholesale access charge w, (ii) the access owner (either vertically integrated 
or separated) sets the investment in network quality x, (iii) firm i (either vertically integrated 
or separated) and the rival firm e simultaneously choose retail prices ip  and ep . As usual, we 
solve the game backwards. 
 
                                                 
18
 The newly revised NRF prescribes that regulation focus on bottlenecks and retail remedies be withdrawn as far 
as possible. While wholesale broadband access is in the list of relevant markets, retail broadband access is not. 
19
 We assume that there is no uncertainty about costs and returns on quality investment. 
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3.1 Vertical integration 
The first scenario is one of vertical integration. We assume that retail services are vertically 
differentiated and consumers have a higher wtp for the incumbent’s service, since the 
following conditions hold: i) vertical integration allows firm i to exploit better operational 
coordination between wholesale and retail activities than the rival firm; and ii) firm i’s retail 
subsidiary has a higher ability than the rival firm to benefit from quality investment20. 
 Let xs +  be consumer s’s valuation of the incumbent’s product, where s  is the 
consumer’s wtp for the basic service (that is, broadband internet access), which is uniformly 
distributed within the interval [ ]1,0 , and x  is the increase in wtp for the value-added services 
that firm i may offer on the basis of the quality-improving investment in the access network. 
Thus, consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the basic service, while they are 
homogeneous in their valuation of advanced services. On the other hand, consumer s’s 
valuation of the rival firm’s product is xs ⋅+⋅ δγ , where γ−1  measures the loss of 
operational coordination due to the fact that firm e is not vertically integrated (alternatively, 
γ  measures the perceived quality of firm e’s basic service), while δ  measures the spillover 
effect, that is, firm e’s ability to transform one unit of quality investment into valuable 
services to end-users (alternatively, 1−δ measures the reduction in the input quality provided 
to the rival firm). For simplicity, we assume that ( )1,32∈γ  and ( )1,32∈δ . 
 We assume that consumers have unit demands. If ei pxspxs −⋅+⋅>−+ δγ  then 
consumer s decides to buy from the incumbent rather than the rival firm, because of a higher 
net utility (otherwise, consumer s buys from firm e). However, if net utilities are both 
                                                 
20
 The source of the latter competitive advantage can be twofold. On the one hand, firm i may have exclusive or 
privileged access to premium content compared with the rival firm with a smaller customer base. On the other 
hand, firm i may react to access regulation by using non-price discrimination, thus providing the downstream 
rival with a lower-quality input than her subsidiary (see e.g. Mandy and Sappington, 2007). 
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negative, then consumer s neither buys from the incumbent nor from the rival firm. Thus, we 
allow for partial market participation, where low-wtp consumers may not be active. Since the 
(perceived) quality of the incumbent’s product is higher than the rival firm’s product, then 
high-wtp consumers buy from firm i. 
 We derive the demand curves of the two firms by identifying the locations of two specific 
consumers. The first consumer, denoted as sˆ , is the one that is indifferent between buying 
from either of the two firms. It follows that ei pxspxs −⋅+⋅=−+ δγ ˆˆ  must hold (where net 
utilities are both positive). Hence, we have ( )
γ
δ
−
−−−
=
1
1
ˆ
xpp
s ei . The second consumer, 
denoted as s , is the one that is indifferent between buying from firm e or not buying at all, 
namely, the marginal consumer. It follows that 0=−⋅+⋅ epxs δγ  must hold. Hence, we 
have 
γ
δ xp
s e
⋅−
= . Since consumers have unit demands and are uniformly distributed within 
the interval [ ]1,0  then firms’ demand curves are linear, and can be expressed respectively as 
sqi ˆ1−=  and ssqe −= ˆ , where 0ˆ1 ≥≥≥ ss  must hold for satisfying feasibility constraints 
on quantities (i.e. 0≥iq , 0≥eq  and 1≤+ ei qq ). Inserting for sˆ  and s , we obtain that: 
( )( )eii ppxq +−−
−
+= δ
γ
1
1
11 ;   ( ) 





−+
−
−
= eie ppxq γγ
δ
γ
11
1
1
. 
 Firms’ profit functions can be written as: 
2
2x
wqqp eiii −+=pi ;   eeee wqqp −=pi . 
Inserting for quantities, we have: 
( )( ) ( )
2
11
1
1
1
11
2xppxwpppx eiieii −





−+
−
−
+




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δ
γ
δ
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( )

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 We define social welfare under vertical integration as CSW ei ++= pipi , that is, the sum 
of firms’ profits and consumer surplus ( ) ( )∫∫ −⋅+⋅+−+=
s
s
e
s
i dspxsdspxsCS
ˆ1
ˆ
δγ . 
 Solving the game, we obtain the following results. For any given γ , we distinguish two 
cases. If firm e’s ability to exploit firm i’s investment is sufficiently high (that is, if 
( )γδδ I≥ , where superscript I denotes the scenario of vertical integration), then we find a 
corner solution of downstream duopoly where each consumer purchases the service21. This 
occurs since the first-stage access charge that is obtained by solving the unconstrained welfare 
maximization problem affects the second-stage quality investment so as the feasibility 
constraint 0≥s  is binding. Hence, we find the optimal investment ( )wx  by solving the 
equation ( ) 0, == wxss  with respect to x, and then we find the optimal access charge Iw  by 
imposing the first-order condition on social welfare.  
 Alternatively, if the investment spillover is limited (that is, if ( )γδδ I< ) then we find a 
corner solution of downstream monopoly where all consumers purchase the service from the 
incumbent. In such a case, both feasibility constraints 0ˆ ≥≥ ss  are binding. Hence, we find 
the optimal investment ( )wxˆ  by solving ( ) 0,ˆ =wxs  with respect to x, and the optimal access 
charge Iwˆ  by solving ( )( ) ( )( ) 0,ˆ,ˆˆ == wwxswwxs . 
 Proposition 1 below proves the results, while Table 1 summarizes the outcome of the 
game in terms of firms’ market shares, quality investment, access charge, and social welfare. 
 
                                                 
21
 Since we have assumed partial participation, then the marginal consumer’s net utility is equal to zero even at 
the zero-location. 
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Proposition 1. Under vertical integration, for any given ( )1,32∈γ  there is a critical value of 
the spillover effect ( ) ( ) ( )1,32
2
43
2
4 2
∈
−
−
+
=
γγγδ I  such that at the equilibrium of the 
game we have what follows: 
(a) If ( ) 1<≤ δγδ I  then the optimal access charge is Iw , the optimal quality investment is 
Ix , and there is a corner solution of a downstream duopoly where all consumers 
purchase the service. 
(b) If ( )γδδ I<<
3
2
 then the optimal access charge is Iwˆ , the optimal quality investment is 
Ixˆ , and there is a corner solution of a downstream monopoly where all consumers 
purchase the service from the vertically integrated firm. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 Let us now analyze how the basic model parameters (γ , that is firm e’s level of 
operational coordination, and δ , that is the demand-side spillover from investment to firm e) 
affect the players’ strategic choices under vertical integration. 
 First, we consider the case when vertical integration is compatible with a downstream 
duopoly (where all consumers are active). A higher firm e’s operational coordination reduces 
quality differentiation between services and enforces retail competition (since we have 
( ) 0≤∂−∂ γwpi , ( ) 0≤∂−∂ γwpe  and ( ) 0≤∂−∂ γei pp )22, thus having a positive impact 
on consumer surplus ( 0≥∂∂ γCS ). While the OLO is able to get higher profit ( 0≥∂∂ γpi e ), 
the retail portion of the integrated firm’s profit decreases ( ( )( ) 0≤∂−∂ γii qwp ). To avoid 
                                                 
22
 We rewrite the integrated firm’s profit so as to highlight the role of the transfer charge w. This allows us to 
decompose the firm’s profit in two portions respectively related to the retail and wholesale segments. 
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that the incumbent reduces investment because of the loss in the retail segment, the regulator 
raises the access charge ( 0≥∂∂ γw ) so as wholesale revenues rise ( ( )( ) 0≥∂+∂ γwqq ei ). 
This induces the incumbent to invest more ( 0≥∂∂ γx ). Nonetheless, the net effect on the 
integrated firm’s profit is so much negative that social welfare reduces ( 0≤∂∂ γW ). 
 On the other hand, a higher investment spillover to firm e reduces quality differentiation 
between services ( ( ) 0≤∂−∂ δei pp ). While the incumbent’s mark-up and profit in the retail 
market are consequently reduced ( ( ) 0≤∂−∂ δwpi  and ( )( ) 0≤∂−∂ δii qwp ), the OLO 
achieves a higher retail margin and profit ( ( ) 0≥∂−∂ δwpe  and 0≥∂∂ δpi e )23. The net 
effect of these changes on consumer surplus is negative ( 0≤∂∂ δCS ). The incumbent’s retail 
profit loss is offset by the gain in wholesale profit ( ( )( ) 022 ≥∂−+∂ δxwqq ei  and 
0≥∂∂ δpi i ). We have to distinguish two alternative cases. When the investment spillover is 
high enough, to exploit the OLO’s higher ability to use investment the regulator raises the 
access charge ( 0≥∂∂ δw ) so as wholesale revenues rise ( ( )( ) 0≥∂+∂ δwqq ei ). This induces 
higher investment and welfare ( 0≥∂∂ δx  and 0≥∂∂ δW ), despite the incumbent raises the 
retail price (less than the OLO). In the case when the spillover is low, the regulator fosters 
competition by reducing the access charge as the spillover rises ( 0≤∂∂ δw ), even if this 
dilutes investment ( 0≤∂∂ δx ). In such a case, the incumbent reduces the retail price. 
However, the overall impact on social welfare is negative ( 0≤∂∂ δW ). 
                                                 
23
 Both a higher operational coordination and a higher investment spillover make the OLO’s service more similar 
to the incumbent’s one. However, a higher spillover reduces the heterogeneity of consumers served by the 
OLO (since their wtp rises by the same amount), while a higher operational coordination amplifies their 
heterogeneity. In other words, a higher spillover means richer and less heterogeneous consumers to the OLO, 
while a higher operational coordination means richer and more heterogeneous consumers to the OLO. 
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 Let us now consider the case when vertical integration leads to a downstream monopoly 
(where all consumers are active). A higher firm e’s operational coordination makes the 
potential entrant more competitive and reduces the incumbent’s retail mark-up (in addition, 
the regulator reduces the access charge that should be paid by an entrant). Therefore, 
consumer surplus benefits from stronger potential competition. The retail profit loss induces 
the incumbent to reduce quality investment. The overall impact on the incumbent’s profit and 
on social welfare is negative when the investment spillover is sufficiently low, and positive 
when it is high enough. 
 On the other hand, a higher investment spillover reduces the incumbent’s mark-up. In 
order to exploit the OLO’s higher ability to use quality investment, the regulator raises the 
access charge. This in turn leads the incumbent to raise investment, but also the retail price 
(so that the gain in wholesale revenues exceeds the retail profit loss). The overall impact on 
consumer surplus is negative, while the incumbent’s profit and social welfare are higher when 
the spillover is low enough, but lower when it is sufficiently high (indeed, they strongly 
depend on the level of quality investment). 
 
3.2 Functional separation 
In the second scenario, we assume that the upstream entity that manages the local network, 
denoted as firm a, is functionally separated from downstream firm i. Different from vertical 
integration, functional separation does not allow the upstream firm to influence the pricing 
strategy of the affiliated downstream firm. Therefore, firm i maximizes own (downstream) 
profit without taking into account firm a’s profit. However, as with vertical integration, the 
upstream unit decides the level of investment in network quality by considering the integrated 
profit (i.e. including firm i’s profit), subject to the obligation to recover the investment cost 
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exclusively through upstream revenues (so as to avoid unfair cross-subsidies between 
upstream and downstream markets). 
 Under functional separation, both downstream firms i and e are provided with the same 
input quality at the same access charge. Thus, we assume that downstream firms have the 
same ability to transform input into output, that is, they equally benefit from quality 
investment. Functional separation does not prevent affiliated downstream and upstream units 
from achieving an effective operational coordination. For simplicity, we assume that 
operational coordination for the functionally separated downstream unit is the same as the 
integrated firm’s retail subsidiary24. Hence, under functional separation high-wtp consumers 
still purchase from firm i. 
 Let x⋅β  be the increase in consumers’ wtp for the value-added services provided by any 
downstream firm on the basis of network investment, where δβ ≥>1 25. Consumer s 
purchases firm i’s product if ei pxspxs −⋅+⋅>−⋅+ βγβ , unless both net utilities are 
negative, in which case consumer s does not buy at all. Given the assumptions of unit demand 
and uniform distribution of consumers within the interval [ ]1,0 , firms’ demand curves are 
linear and can be written as: 
γ−
−
−=−=
1
1ˆ1 eii
pp
sq ;   
γ
β
γ
xppp
ssq eeie
⋅−
−
−
−
=−=
1
ˆ , 
provided that the feasibility constraints 0ˆ1 ≥≥≥ ss  hold. 
 Profit functions respectively of firms a, i and e are the following: 
                                                 
24
 Operational coordination under functional separation should be slightly lower than the one under vertical 
integration. However, since operational coordination under both scenarios is much larger than under structural 
separation, we can reasonably simplify the analysis by assuming that it is the same under both scenarios. 
25
 Thus, under vertical separation, both downstream firms’ abilities to use network investment are not lower than 
the rival firm under vertical integration, but are lower than the integrated firm’s retail subsidiary. 
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( )
2
2xqqw eia −+=pi ;   iiii wqqp −=pi ;   eeee wqqp −=pi . 
However, firm a sets the investment level x by maximizing profit ia pipi +  (subject to 0≥api ). 
Inserting for quantities, we obtain: 
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 We define social welfare under functional separation as ( ) CSW eia +++= pipipi , that is, 
the sum of firms’ profits and consumer surplus ( ) ( )∫∫ −⋅+⋅+−⋅+=
s
s
e
s
i dspxsdspxsCS
ˆ1
ˆ
βγβ . 
 Solving the game, we obtain the following results. For any given γ , we distinguish two 
cases. If downstream firms’ ability to exploit network investment is sufficiently high (that is, 
if ( )γββ f> , where superscript f denotes the scenario of functional separation), then we find 
a corner solution of downstream duopoly where each consumer purchases the service. Indeed, 
the first-stage access charge that is obtained by solving the unconstrained welfare 
maximization problem induces firm a to raise the second-stage quality investment so that the 
marginal consumer is located at zero (since the feasibility constraint 0≥s  is binding), and 
purchases from firm e. Hence, we find the optimal investment ( )wx  by solving the equation 
( ) 0, == wxss  with respect to x, and then we find the optimal access charge fw  by imposing 
the first-order condition on social welfare. 
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 Alternatively, if the investment spillover is limited (that is, if ( )γββ f≤ ) then we have a 
downstream duopoly where low-wtp consumers do not buy at all. In such a case, the 
feasibility constraints on the marginal and on the indifferent consumer are not binding. 
 Proposition 2 proves the above discussed results, while Table 2 reports the outcome of the 
game in terms of firms’ market shares, quality investment, access charge, and social welfare. 
 
Proposition 2. Under functional separation, for any given ( )1,3/2∈γ  there is a critical value 
of the spillover effect ( ) ( )1,32∈γβ f  such that at the equilibrium of the game we have that: 
(a) If ( ) 1<< βγβ f  then the optimal access charge is fw , the optimal quality investment is 
fx , and there is a corner solution of downstream duopoly where all consumers purchase 
the service. 
(b) If ( )γββ f≤<32  then the optimal access charge is fw) , the optimal quality investment 
is fx) , and there is a downstream duopoly where low-wtp consumers do not buy at all. 
Proof. See Appendix, where we also relegate the expression of ( )γβ f . 
 
 Let us now analyze how the basic model parameters (γ , that is firm e’s level of 
operational coordination, and β , that is the demand-side spillover from investment to both 
downstream firms) affect the players’ strategic choices under functional separation. 
 We first consider the case when all consumers purchase the service. A higher firm e’s 
operational coordination reinforces retail competition by reducing quality differentiation 
between services. This in turn positively affects consumer surplus, and negatively affects 
downstream firms’ profits. The regulator raises the access charge, and thus wholesale 
revenues ( 0≥∂∂ γpi a ), so as to induce firm a to guarantee the same investment level despite 
 19 
firm i’s profit loss ( 0=∂∂ γx )26. However, the functionally separated incumbent loses profit 
( ( ) 0≤∂+∂ γpipi ia ). The overall impact on social welfare is positive. 
 Similarly, a higher spillover to downstream firms reduces quality differentiation between 
services ( ( ) 0≤∂−∂ βei pp ), so as retail competition reduces firms’ mark-ups and profits 
( ( ) 0≤∂−∂ βwpi , ( ) 0≤∂−∂ βwpe , 0≤∂∂ βpi i  and 0≤∂∂ βpi e ), while it raises 
consumer surplus ( 0≥∂∂ βCS ). The regulator raises the access charge ( 0≥∂∂ βw ) so as to 
exploit downstream firms’ higher abilities of using quality investment, thus inducing higher 
wholesale revenues ( )( ) 0≥∂+∂ βwqq ei . This induces quality investment to rise 
( 0≥∂∂ βx ). On the whole, the functionally separated incumbent’s profit also rises 
( ( ) 0≥∂+∂ βpipi ia ). The overall impact on welfare is positive ( 0≥∂∂ βW ). 
 Let us now consider the case when some consumers stay out of the market. A higher firm 
e’s operational coordination reduces quality differentiation as well as downstream firms’ 
markups and profits. The overall quantity sold also reduces due to lower quality 
differentiation. When the spillover is sufficiently low, the regulator raises the access charge 
and thus wholesale revenues ( ( )( ) 0≥∂+∂ γwqq ei ) to contain the negative impact of the 
demand contraction on firm a’s investment ( 0≤∂∂ γx ). However, the wholesale profit gain 
partially balances the retail profit loss ( ( ) 0≤∂+∂ γpipi ia ). The overall impact on consumer 
surplus and social welfare is positive. Things are different when the spillover is sufficiently 
high. In such a case, lower quality differentiation moderately affects firm a’s investment. 
Therefore, the regulator contrasts the demand contraction by reducing the access charge 
( 0≤∂∂ γw ), and consequently inducing lower retail prices. However, this causes a loss of 
                                                 
26
 Thus, quality investment becomes independent of operational coordination. 
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quality investment. The overall impact on the functionally separated firm’s profit, consumer 
surplus and social welfare is negative. 
 Finally, a higher spillover to downstream firms increases all consumers’ wtp. The 
regulator exploits downstream firms’ higher abilities to use quality investment by raising the 
access charge which, in turn, induces higher investment (but also higher retail prices). Both 
firm a’s and the whole functionally separated firm’s profits rise, and so does welfare. When 
the spillover is sufficiently low, but the OLO’s operational coordination is sufficiently high 
(i.e. consumers of both downstream firms are sufficiently heterogeneous), retail competition 
reduces demand and consumer surplus, as well as downstream firms’ mark-ups and profits. In 
the case when the spillover is sufficiently high, but the OLO’s operational coordination is 
sufficiently low (i.e. consumers of both downstream firms are sufficiently homogeneous), 
demand and consumer surplus rise, and so do downstream firms’ mark-ups and profits. 
 
3.3 Structural separation 
In the third scenario, we assume that upstream firm a is structurally separated from 
downstream firm i. Since firm a does not have any affiliated entity in the retail market, then 
firm a’s profit entirely derives from selling wholesale access to downstream firms (at a 
regulated charge). Thus, firm a sets the investment level x on the sole basis of that profit. 
 As with functional separation, under structural separation firm a provides both 
downstream firms with the same input quality at the same access charge. On the other hand, 
structural separation reduces operational coordination. We assume that downstream firms 
have a lower operational coordination with upstream activities than the integrated firm’s retail 
subsidiary (or firm a’s affiliated retail entity under functional separation). We also assume 
that downstream firms have the same operational coordination. Hence, downstream firms are 
now identical to consumers since they compete with a homogeneous product. 
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 Let x⋅β  be the increase in consumers’ wtp for the value-added services provided by any 
downstream firm on the basis of quality investment, where δβ ≥>1 . Consumer s ’s net 
utility respectively is ipxs −⋅+⋅ βγ  or epxs −⋅+⋅ βγ , depending on the firm the consumer 
purchases from. Since retail services are homogeneous, then symmetrical downstream firms 
competing à la Bertrand set the retail price at the production cost, that is, the wholesale access 
charge. It follows that the marginal consumer is located at 
γ
β xw
s
⋅−
= , and the overall 
demand is equal to sqq ei −=+ 1  (given the assumptions of unit demand and uniform 
distribution of consumers within [ ]1,0 ), provided that the feasibility constraints 01 ≥≥ s  hold. 
 Profit functions respectively of firms a, i and e are the following: 
( )
2
2xqqw eia −+=pi ;   iiii wqqp −=pi ;   eeee wqqp −=pi . 
 Inserting for quantities and wpp ei == , we obtain: 
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1
2xxw
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 We define social welfare under structural separation as CSW eia +++= pipipi , where 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫∫ −⋅+⋅=−⋅+⋅+−⋅+⋅=
1ˆ1
ˆ s
s
s
e
s
i dswxsdspxsdspxsCS βγβγβγ  is consumer surplus. 
 Following exactly the same reasoning as under functional separation, we obtain the results 
that are summarized in Proposition 3, while Table 3 reports the outcome of the game in terms 
of firms’ market shares, quality investment, access charge, and social welfare (superscript s 
denotes the scenario of structural separation). 
 
Proposition 3. Under structural separation, for any given ( )1,3/2∈γ  there is a critical value of 
the spillover effect ( ) ( )1,32∈= γγβ s  such that at the equilibrium of the game we have that: 
 22 
(a) If ( ) 1<< βγβ s  then the optimal access charge is sw , the optimal quality investment is 
sx , and there is a corner solution of downstream duopoly where all consumers purchase 
the service. 
 (a) If ( )γββ s≤<
3
2
 then the optimal access charge is sw) , the optimal quality investment is 
s
x
)
, and there is a downstream duopoly where low-wtp consumers do not buy at all. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 Let us now analyze how the basic model parameters (γ , that is both downstream firms’ 
level of operational coordination, and β , that is the demand-side spillover from investment to 
both downstream firms) affect the players’ strategic choices under structural separation. Since 
downstream firms are perfectly symmetric, retail price competition extracts any extra profit 
and there is a unique retail price that is equal to the (regulated) access charge. 
 When all consumers purchase the service, a higher operational coordination does not have 
an impact on either the access charge or the investment level. In fact, a higher coordination 
does not affect the lowest-wtp consumer’s wtp, and thus the price this consumer pays, which 
is exactly the access charge. As a consequence, wholesale revenues do not change, and so 
does investment. However, both consumer surplus and social welfare increase. 
 On the other hand, a higher spillover to downstream firms induces the regulator to raise 
the access charge so that wholesale revenues and profits also rise. Thus, we have a higher 
investment. While there is no impact on consumer surplus, welfare is positively affected. 
 When some consumers are not active, a higher operational coordination raise the overall 
quantity sold when the operational coordination is sufficiently high, but the spillover is low 
(i.e. consumers of both downstream firms are sufficiently heterogeneous). In such a case, the 
regulator induces higher wholesale revenues by raising the access charge, in order to contain 
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the reduction of firm a’s investment. In fact, new active consumers are a source of revenue 
that allows firm a to invest less (in other words, there is a sort of substitution effect between 
higher operational coordination and lower quality investment in terms of consumers’ wtp). 
The overall impact on wholesale profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare is positive. In 
the case when the operational coordination is low, but the spillover is sufficiently high (i.e. 
consumers of both downstream firms are sufficiently homogeneous), the overall demand does 
shrink. The regulator contrasts the demand loss by reducing the access charge and 
consequently inducing lower retail prices (but also lower investment). The overall impact is 
positive on firm a’ profit, but negative on consumer surplus and social welfare. 
 On the other hand, a higher spillover to downstream firms increases all consumers’ wtp. 
In order to exploit downstream firms’ higher ability to use quality investment, the regulator 
raises the access charge which, in turn, induces higher investment and higher retail prices. 
Firm a’s profit rises, and so does social welfare. When the spillover is low, but the operational 
coordination is sufficiently high, retail competition reduces demand and thus consumer 
surplus, while we have the opposite effect when the spillover is sufficiently high, but the 
operational coordination is low. 
 
3.4 Comparison of results under different vertical industry structures 
Let us now compare the outcome of the game in the three alternative scenarios, particularly in 
terms of quality investment and social welfare. For both clarity and conciseness, in what 
follows we analyze and discuss the main results by means of two-dimensional γβ  (i.e. 
‘operational coordination’ vs. ‘spillover from investment’) diagrams27. In detail, we set the 
investment spillover to the rival firm under vertical integration to three different values, 
                                                 
27
 However, all formal proofs are available from the authors on request. 
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namely, (a) exactly equal to the investment spillover under vertical separation; (b) close to the 
lowest feasible value (i.e. 2/3); and (c) at an intermediate value between cases (a) and (b). 
Thus, given ( ]100,0∈k , we set ( ) ( ) ( ) βδ ⋅+⋅−= 100321001 kkk  and we consider the cases of 
( )100100 δδ = , ( )5050 δδ =  and ( )11 δδ = . It follows that we reduce the parameter space to 
three γβ  diagrams relative to the 100δ , 50δ  and 1δ  cases. In each diagram, white, light gray 
and dark gray areas respectively indicate that the relevant variable takes the highest value 
under vertical integration, functional separation and structural separation. Given a γβ  
diagram related to kδ , the area below the curve denoted as ( )γµk  is characterized by 
monopoly under vertical integration, while in the area above ( )γµk  vertical integration allows 
duopoly at the equilibrium (if curve ( )γµk  is not reported at all, then there is a monopoly 
under vertical integration for any γ  and β ). 
 
   
100δ  50δ  1δ  
 
Figure 1. Separation vs. integration: a comparison of the access charge. 
 
( )γµ100  ( )γµ50  
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Figure 2. Separation vs. integration: a comparison of quality investment. 
 
   
100δ  50δ  1δ  
 
Figure 3. Separation vs. integration: a comparison of social welfare. 
 
 First, we find the expected result that vertical separation induces higher downstream 
competition than integration. In particular, while under vertical separation the downstream 
market is always a duopoly, in some circumstances the vertically integrated firm invests so 
much as to achieve a downstream monopoly (even though the access charge is regulated). 
( )γµ100  ( )γµ50  
( )γµ100  ( )γµ50  
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 A less intuitive result is that vertical separation is not always associated with a higher 
(regulated) access charge (see Figure 1)28. In addition, we find out that a higher (regulated) 
access charge does not always imply higher investment (see figures 1 and 2). 
 More interestingly, we find that generally vertical separation does not face the trade-off 
between promoting competition and ensuring investment. Indeed, our results show that 
vertical separation more effectively induces higher quality investment exactly when it also 
effectively induces downstream competition, because the integrated firm can severely 
discriminate the downstream rival (see Figure 229). Under the same circumstances, when the 
access owner’s investment is higher under vertical separation than integration, this is also 
welfare-improving30. Figure 3 shows that this occurs particularly under functional separation. 
 The results obtained show that, in the case whereby vertical integration induces a 
downstream monopoly, there are many circumstances where both quality investment and 
social welfare benefit from either functional or structural separation, namely, when there is a 
small loss of operational coordination, or the investment spillover is high. On the other hand, 
when there is a duopoly under integration, a necessary condition for separation to raise 
investment is that separation does not reduce market participation. This condition is also 
sufficient when the investment spillover is high enough. We remark that when the operational 
coordination is sufficiently high, so as it dominates the spillover effect (i.e. when γ  is high 
and γβ < ), welfare maximization implies a loss in quality investment, since investment is 
always higher under structural separation, but functional separation generally raises welfare. 
                                                 
28
 However, the access charge is always higher under structural separation than under functional separation. 
29
 We remark that in the same areas where structural separation induces higher investment, functional separation 
dominates integration. Moreover, in the area where functional separation induces higher investment, functional 
and structural separation indeed induce the same level of investment. 
30
 Welfare results are gross of the one-off cost of divestment of the integrated firm. 
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 On the whole, the results obtained point out a unique trend that relates both quality 
investment and welfare to the spillover effect. In fact, the larger the difference between the 
spillover effect under separation and integration, the wider the area where both investment 
and welfare are higher under separation than integration. This means that separation is 
particularly effective when the vertically integrated firm is able to significantly reduce the 
input quality to the rival firm. In such cases, ensuring ‘equivalence of inputs’ to downstream 
competitors through vertical separation also produces higher investment in the quality of the 
access network. 
4 Concluding remarks 
Mandatory vertical separation of the dominant firm in fixed telecommunications can be both 
an effective and proportionate regulatory remedy to prevent price and, above all, non-price 
discrimination of downstream rivals, particularly in those countries where (i) the local access 
network is an enduring economic bottleneck, so that both within-platform and between-
platform end-to-end competition is not sustainable in the mass market, and (ii) the vertically 
integrated firm has repeatedly breached either the regulatory contract or antitrust laws. 
 One of the most critical issues is the common presumption that vertical separation of the 
bottleneck owner (either of the functional or the structural type) would cause a decline in 
investment in network quality or size. This presumption has been supported by some literature 
findings that are relevant to specific network industries (such as energy and railways). 
 In this paper, we have assessed whether or not this presumption does hold for fixed 
telecommunications, given that several incumbents worldwide have recently announced or 
undertaken massive investment in deploying new access networks, the so-called NGAs. We 
have shown that quality-enhancing network investment may be higher under each type of 
vertical separation than integration, particularly if the integrated firm is far from ensuring 
equivalent access to the bottleneck input to downstream competitors. Consequently, vertical 
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separation more effectively improves quality investment exactly when it is also an effective 
remedy to foster competition. We have also shown that, due to the investment cost, it is 
mostly functional (rather than structural) separation that may improve social welfare 
compared with an integrated structure. When the integrated firm forecloses the downstream 
rival, a necessary condition for separation to raise welfare is that it raises investment. 
 We have a higher access charge and higher investment under structural rather than 
functional separation. However, there are no clear-cut results when vertical separation is 
compared with integration. In fact, separation does not always imply a higher access charge, 
and a higher charge in turn does not always imply higher investment. 
 These results follow from having explicitly recognized that the optimal (regulated) access 
charge in view of quality investment depends on the different retail competitive conditions 
associated with the different vertical industry structures, and from having considered two 
basic features of the retail broadband access market, namely, imperfect price competition with 
differentiated products and partial participation. 
 We have obtained these results albeit our model takes account of efficiency losses induced 
by vertical separation, due to arising coordination problems between upstream and 
downstream operational and investment activities. Admittedly, vertical separation is socially 
beneficial when it generates a small loss of operational coordination and/or the spillover from 
quality investment is sufficiently high. 
 The results obtained depend in part on model formulation, and thus on the specific 
assumptions on demand and cost functions, as well as the nature of downstream competition. 
Nonetheless, the qualitative result that vertical separation may raise both quality investment 
and welfare is not diluted in some alternative model specifications. 
 Indeed, vertical separation creates a level playing field for downstream competition. As a 
consequence, we have removed the assumption that the incumbent has a higher ability to use 
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network investment in order to provide advanced services, which does hold under vertical 
integration. We have thus stressed that under vertical separation the incumbent can no longer 
enforce input quality discrimination. However, we have ruled out the cases where service 
providers have a different ability to use quality investment in order to provide advanced 
services31, or where an open access regime to the essential input fosters retail product 
innovation so much as to offset potential hold-up problems induced by vertical separation. It 
follows that we may have underestimated the positive impact of vertical separation on 
investment, and possibly on welfare. 
 An alternative model formulation would be one of horizontal product differentiation à la 
Hotelling in the retail broadband access market. A basic assumption of the Hotelling model is 
full market participation, which means that all consumers are always served. Since vertical 
separation often reduces the retail quantity sold in our vertical differentiation model with 
partial participation, then it is plausible that the positive effect of separation on investment 
and welfare would be preserved, and possibly toughened with horizontal differentiation. 
 Finally, there are several dimensions along which our research can be extended in future 
work. First, there is the risk that vertical separation reduces incentives for new entrants to 
invest in competitive infrastructures. This tendency may be strengthened by the costs and 
technical architectures of NGAs. It would thus be of interest to assess the impact of structural 
changes in the industry on the prevailing regulatory model in Europe, which is based on the 
paradigm of the ladder of investment (ERG, 2006)32. 
                                                 
31
 Matteucci and Reverberi (2005a) consider this possibility in a model of international trade, when comparing 
welfare effects of different exhaustion regimes of intellectual property rights. 
32
 According to this paradigm, service-based and facility-based competition are complement and not substitute 
entry modes. Thus, developing an alternative network is not so much a question of time per se as is related to 
building a customer base that increases reputation and brand loyalty to the OLO, and reduces the (unit) cost 
and the risk of network investment. See Avenali et al. (2009) for a formal analysis of the ladder model. 
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 Second, there is the risk that the deployment of NGAs amplifies the digital divide between 
the most and the least developed areas of the country. This poses the question whether or not 
broadband access should be part of universal service obligations33, and whether and how 
public intervention may bridge the broadband gap. It would thus be appropriate to study the 
feasibility of a model of differentiated wholesale regulation on a geographic basis, and to 
analyze the impact of the vertical industry structure on universal service cost and funding. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the game backwards. First we find the third-stage optimal 
retail prices by the first-order condition on firms’ profits (given that the second-order 
condition is always fulfilled): 
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 At the second stage, firm i maximizes her profit with respect to quality investment. By the 
first-order condition on firm i’s profit we find the optimal investment 
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 Matteucci and Reverberi (2005b) analyze this problem in a different context, that is, they assess welfare 
effects of public service obligations in pharmaceuticals.  
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 In the remaining cases, either ( )( ) 0, ≥wwxs )  or ( )( ) 0,ˆ ≥wwxs )  does not hold. First, let 
( )( ) 0, <wwxs )  but ( )( ) 0,ˆ ≥wwxs ) . In such a case, we find the optimal investment by solving 
the equation ( ) 0, =wxs , and obtain ( ) ( )δγ
γγγ
2
2 22
+
++−
=
w
wx . It is easy to verify that 
( )( ) 0,ˆ ≥wwxs )  if and only if ( )δ
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1
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1
w , then we have that ( )( ) 0,ˆ <wwxs ) . 
In such a case, we find the optimal investment by solving the equation ( ) 0,ˆ =wxs , and obtain 
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 At the first stage, the regulator maximizes welfare with respect to the access charge. 
Assume that both ( )23
2
1 γγδγ −≤≤  and www ′′≤≤′  hold, so that the second-stage optimal 
investment is ( )wx) . Since the welfare function is concave in w then the regulator chooses the 
optimal access charge by the first-order condition ( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW )
, and thus finds w)  (for 
brevity, we omit the expression of w) ). However, computation yields that w)  is such that 
www ′′≤≤′ )  cannot hold, so that the feasibility constraints ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs ))))  cannot be 
fulfilled. In such a case, the consumer at 0=s  buys from firm e and the optimal investment 
level is ( )wx  if and only if ( )δ
δγ
−
−≤
1
1
w . Inserting for ( )wx  and solving for 
( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW
, we find the access charge ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )δδδγγγ δγδγγγγ +−++−+++− +++−−+−= 231231 21311 232
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some algebra, we obtain that ( )δ
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 In the case when ( )γδδ I<<
3
2
, we have that ( )( ) 0,ˆ <wwxs . Hence, the consumer at 
0=s  buys from firm i and the optimal investment is ( )wxˆ . Since ( )( ) 0,ˆˆ =wwxs , then the 
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condition ( )( ) ( )( ) 0,ˆ,ˆˆ ≥≥ wwxswwxs  is binding. It follows that the optimal access charge Iwˆ  
is obtained by solving the equation ( )( ) ( )( )wwxswwxs ,ˆ,ˆˆ = .■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let solve the game backwards. Given that the second-order condition 
is always fulfilled, we find the third-stage optimal retail prices by the first-order condition on 
firms’ profits: 
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 Inserting for ( )wxpi ,)  and ( )wxpe ,) , the feasibility constraints ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs  are 
satisfied in the following cases: (a) when 20 γ≤≤ w  and ( )2
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. In the remaining cases, either 
( ) 0, ≥wxs  or ( ) ( )wxswxs ,,ˆ ≥  does not hold ( ( ) 0, <wxs  when ( )2
2 2
+
−⋅++
>
γβ
γγγ ww
x ); 
( ) ( )wxswxs ,,ˆ <  when 2γ>w  and β
γ
2
20 −<≤ wx ). 
 At the second stage, firm a maximizes the joint profit (upstream-downstream) 
( ) ( )wxwx ia ,, pipi +  with respect to quality investment. The joint profit function is strictly 
concave in x. Hence, by the first-order condition on firm a’s profit we find the optimal 
investment ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )124 448 22
2
−+−
−++
=
γβγγ
γγβ ww
wx
)
. Since the welfare function ( )( )wwxW ,)  is strictly 
concave in w, then the optimal access charge fw)  selected by the regulator at the equilibrium 
is given by the first-order condition ( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW )
. By inserting for ( )wx)  and fw)  in 
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constraints ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs , we find that ( )wx)  and fw)  are feasible iff 
( ) ( )432 8765432432 412185672 42813243842240256409668128032 γγγγ γγγγγγγγγγγγγγββ ++++ +−−+−++−+−++−=≤< f . 
 Let us consider now the cases where either ( )( ) 0, ≥ff wwxs )))  or 
( )( ) ( )( )ffff wwxswwxs )))))) ,,ˆ ≥  does not hold. The latter constraint is always satisfied, while 
( )( ) 0, <ff wwxs )))  (i.e. ( ) ( )2
2 2
+
−⋅++
>
γβ
γγγ fff wwwx
))
)) ) iff ( ) 1<< βγβ f . In this case, we find 
the optimal quality investment by solving the equation ( ) 0, =wxs , and obtain 
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2 2
+
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wx . Since the welfare function ( )( )wwxW ,  is strictly concave in w, 
then the access charge fw  selected by the regulator at the equilibrium is given by the first-
order condition ( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW
. By inserting for ( )wx  and fw  in constraints 
( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs , we find that ( )wx  and fw  are feasible iff ( ) 1<< βγβ f .■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let solve the game backwards. Since, downstream firms i and e are 
identical, the retail price selected by downstream firms at the third stage of the game are equal 
to the wholesale access charge (Bertrand competition), that is, ( ) ( ) wwxpwxp ei == ,, )) ; thus, 
the marginal consumer is equal to 
γ
β xw ⋅−
. Inserting for ( )wxpi ,)  and ( )wxpe ,) , the model 
validity constraints ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs  are satisfied in the following cases: (i) when 
γ≤≤ w0  and β
w
x ≤≤0 , (ii) when γ>w  and ββ
γ w
x
w ≤≤− . In the remaining cases, either 
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( ) 0, ≥wxs  or ( ) 1, ≤wxs  does not hold ( ( ) 0, <wxs  when β
w
x > ); ( ) 1, >wxs  when γ>w  
and β
γ−
<≤ wx0 ). 
 At the second stage, firm a maximizes its profit ( )wxa ,pi  with respect to quality 
investment. The profit function is strictly concave in x. Hence, by the first-order condition on 
firm a’s profit we find the optimal investment ( )
γ
β w
wx
⋅
=
)
. Since the welfare function 
( )( )wwxW ,)  is strictly concave in w, then the optimal access charge sw)  selected by the 
regulator at the equilibrium is given by the first-order condition ( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW )
. By 
inserting for ( )wx)  and sw)  in constraints ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs , we find that ( )wx)  and sw)  
are feasible iff ( )γββ s≤<32 . 
 Let us consider now the cases where either ( )( ) 0, ≥ss wwxs )))  or ( )( ) 1, ≤ss wwxs )))  does not 
hold. The latter constraint is always satisfied, while ( )( ) 0, <ss wwxs )))  (i.e. ( ) β
s
s wwx
)
))
> ) iff 
( ) 1<< βγβ s . In this case, we find the optimal quality investment by solving the equation 
( ) 0, =wxs , and obtain ( ) β
w
wx = . Since the welfare function ( )( )wwxW ,  is strictly concave 
in w, then the access charge sw  selected by the regulator at the equilibrium is given by the 
first-order condition ( )( ) 0, =
∂
∂
w
wwxW
. By inserting for ( )wx  and sw  in constraints 
( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ1 ≥≥≥ wxswxs , we find that ( )wx  and sw  are feasible iff ( ) 1<< βγβ s .■ 
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Tables 
The following tables summarize the outcomes of the game respectively under vertical 
integration, functional separation and structural separation, in terms of firms’ market shares, 
quality investment, access charge and social welfare. 
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( )γδδ I<<
3
2
 ( ) 1<≤ δγδ I  
1ˆ =Iiq  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 123123
121232
232
22
−+−++−++
+−++−+
=
δδδγγγ
δδγγδγγI
iq  
0ˆ =Ieq  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 123123
41
232
22
−+−++−++
++−+
=
δδδγγγ
δδγγI
eq  
δ
γ
−
−
=
1
1
ˆ
Ix  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) 123123
331
232
−+−++−++
++++−
=
δδδγγγ
δγγδγIx  
( )
δ
δγ
−
−
=
1
1
ˆ
Iw  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) 123123
21311
232
22
−+−++−++
+++−−+−
=
δδδγγγ
δγδγγγγIw  
( )
( )2
2
1
422
ˆ
δ
δδγδγ
−
−++−
=
IW  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )δδδγγγ δδγδγδδγ +−++−+++− −+−+++++−+= 2312312 323125322 232
23
IW  
 
Table 1. Vertical integration – outcome of the game. 
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( )γββ f≤<
3
2
 ( ) 1<< βγβ f  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )γγγγβγγγγβγγγ
γγγγβγγγβγγγ
+−+−++−+++++++−−
−++−+++−+−++−−
=
14464128232848544
74406421222142
243422
2422
f
iq
)
 
γ
γ
+
+
=
2
1f
iq  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )γγγγβγγγγβγγγ
γγγβγγγβγγ
+−+−++−+++++++−−
++++++−++−
=
14464128232848544
2622443
243422
242222
f
eq
)
 
γ+
=
2
1f
eq  
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )γγγγβγγγγβγγγ
γγγβγγγγβ
+−+−++−+++++++−−
+−++−+−+−−
=
14464128232848544
52272144
243422
222
f
x
)
 β=fx  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )γγγγβγγγγβγγγ
γγγβγγγγβγγγγ
+−+−++−+++++++−−
++−+−+−+−+−+−+−−
=
14464128232848544
14122910280144
243422
24222
fw
)
 
γ
γβ
+
+++−=
2
63 2fw
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )γγγγβγγγγβγγγ
γγγγγβγγγβγγγ
+−+−++−+++++++−−
−+−++−++++−−++−−
=
144641282328485442
2362096453612143
243422
22422
fW
)
 
( ) ( )
( )2
22
22
523
γ
γγγβ
+
++++
=
fW  
 
Table 2. Functional separation – outcome of the game. 
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( )γββ s≤<
3
2
 ( ) 1<< βγβ s  
224
2
γβγβ
γ
+⋅+−
=+ se
s
i qq
))
 
1=+ se
s
i qq  
224
3
γβγβ
βγ
+⋅+−
⋅
=
sx
)
 β=sx  
224
22
γβγβ
βγ
+⋅+−
⋅
=
sw
)
 
2β=sw  
( )
( )224
22
2 γβγβ
βγγ
+⋅+−
+
=
sW
)
 
( )2
2
1 βγ +=sW  
 
Table 3. Structural separation – outcome of the game. 
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